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I. INTRODUCTIONON JULY 12, 1994, seventy percent of the shareholders of
UAL Corporation, the parent company of United Airlines,
Inc. (United), approved a buyout of fifty-five percent of UAL's
stock by its employees.' With approximately fifty-four thousand
of United's seventy-six thousand total employees participating,2
the transaction made United the only major airline and the sec-
ond largest company in the United States that is majority-owned
by its employees, based on number of employees.3
The majority ownership of the world's largest airline 4 by its
employees has renewed the debate over the advantages and dis-
advantages of employee-owned companies, including airlines.
The increasing growth of employee-owned businesses over the
last two decades has fueled this debate. As of October 1994, ap-
proximately ten-thousand U.S. companies, "employing more
than 11 million workers, have adopted some form of employee
ownership.... [C]ompany employees now own stock in nearly
one-third of the Fortune Industrial 500 and one-fifth of the For-
tune Service 500."- The dismal past performance of the U.S.
airline industry highlights the significance of the introduction
of large-scale employee-ownership of airlines: U.S. airlines lost
$12.7 billion between 1990 and 1993;6 more than 170 airlines
1 Michael J. McCarthy & Carl Quintanilla, Holders of UAL Approve Bold Buyout
That Gives Workers Majority Control, WALL ST. J.,July 3, 1994, at A3; Stanley Ziemba,
Uniting United 1st Task for Worker-Owners, CHI. TRIB., July 13, 1994, at 1.
2 Ziemba, supra note 1, at 1.
s Top Employee-Owned Firms, USA TODAY, July 13, 1994, at lB. Publix Supermar-
kets, with approximately 87,000 employees, remains the largest company in the
United States that is majority-owned by its employees. Id.
4 Janice Castro, Fly It? They Own It; Now That United Airlines Employees Have
Bought Control, Can They Do What It Takes to Run It?, TIME, July 25, 1994, at 46.
5 Washington State Community, Trade and Economic Development: Governor Calls Em-
ployee-Owned Firms Hig[h] Performers, PR Newswire, Oct. 4, 1994, available in
NEXIS, News Library, Wires file.
6 Robin Sidel, U.S. Airlines Headedfor More Turbulence in 1995, Reuters, Dec. 20,
1994, available in NEXIS, News Library, Wires file.
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failed in the 1980s;7 and several carriers are currently on the
brink of bankruptcy or liquidation.8
This Comment explores several of the major issues underlying
the debate over the effectiveness of employee-owned airlines.
Part II provides background on employee stock ownership
plans, which companies often use to structure employee
buyouts. This section also explains the mechanics and goals of
the United buyout. Part III discusses the history of employee
ownership in the airline industry. Part IV covers the history of
employee ownership in other industries. Part V looks into the
advantages of employee-owned airlines, while Part VI covers the
disadvantages. Finally, Part VII forecasts the future of employee
ownership in the U.S. airline industry.
II. THE MECHANICS OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP
PLANS (ESOPS) AND THE UNITED BUYOUT
A. How ESOPS WoRK
Although workers may gain control of their companies
through a variety of means, such as codetermination, labor rep-
resentation on corporate boards, and collective bargaining, this
Comment focuses on the most popular form of employee own-
ership-employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs).' Over the
last decade, ESOPs have enabled millions of American workers
to become shareholders of their companies.' 0 The basic defini-
tion of an ESOP is "an employee benefit plan which is qualified
under I.R.C. § 401 (a) and is designed to invest primarily in qual-
ifying employer securities."'"
The invention of ESOPs is credited to Louis 0. Kelso, a San
Francisco lawyer and investment banker who saw ESOPs as a
method for spreading ownership of corporate America among
the workers. 12 In 1958 Kelso helped the employees of a West
7 Julie Schmit, Employee-Owners Make Kiwi fly; Small Airline Glides Upward on Loy-lalty, USA TODAY, Sept. 22, 1994, at B1, B2.
8 Sidel, supra note 6.
9 JOHN L. COTTON, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT: METHODS FOR IMPROVING PER-
FORMANCE AND WORK ATTITUDES 203 (1993).
10 Carol A. Click, Note, Labor-Management Cooperative Programs: Do They Foster or
Frustrate National Labor Policy ?, 7 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 219, 241-42 (1989).
1 Scott P. Spector, Special Rules and Tax Provisions Relating to Employee Stock
Ownership Plans (ESOPs), in UNDERSTANDING ERISA 1994: AN INTRODUCTION TO
BASIC EMPLOYEE RETIRMENT BENEFITS 1 (PLI Tax Law and Estate Planning Course
Handbook Series No. J4-3674, 1994).
12 Glick, supra note 10, at 242.
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Coast newspaper take over their company by using an existing
stock bonus plan as collateral on a loan.13 ESOPs did not really
catch on, however, until 1974, when Senator Russell Long of
Louisiana pushed favorable tax legislation for ESOPs through
Congress. This legislation made contributions to ESOPs by the
plan sponsor tax-deductible to the sponsor.14
The first step in implementing an ESOP is the creation of a.
trust to hold the shares of stock acquired for the ESOP.15 The
trust may purchase the stock on the open market, from individ-
ual stockholders, or from the company's treasury. 16 The trust
then allocates shares of stock to individual employee's accounts.
Employees who have vested in their shares receive the stock or
its cash value when they retire or otherwise terminate employ-
ment with the company.17
A special form of ESOP that provides a method for financing
the purchase of stock for the trust is the leveraged ESOP.'8 With
a leveraged ESOP, the company borrows money through its
ESOP to purchase some of its own stock (from its treasury or on
the open market), securing the loan with corporate assets. 19
The company then uses its earnings to make tax-deductible con-
tributions to the ESOP to repay the loans.20
Companies primarily use their ESOPs to accomplish one or
more of the following purposes:
1. As a method of providing their employees with an additional
fringe benefit;21
2. As a means for fighting a hostile takeover attempt,22 or other-
wise preventing an outside ownership interest (e.g., to purchase
13 COTTON, supra note 9, at 203-04 (citing Louis 0. KELSO & MORTIMERJ. AD-
LER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO (1958)).
14 Id. Other favorable tax rules enjoyed by ESOPs are discussed infra Part V.






21 Robert B. Moberly, New Directions in Worker Participation and Collective
Bargaining, Address at the 1985 Russell Dunbar Labor Law Lecture, West Vir-
ginia University College of Law, in 87 W. VA. L. REv. 765, 772 (1985).
22 Corey Rosen & Michael Quarrey, How Well Is Employee Ownership Looking?,
HI- v. Bus. REv. Sept.-Oct. 1987, at 126.
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the stock of an owner who is retiring from a closely-held
company) ;23
3. As a financing vehicle, because a company can borrow through
a leveraged ESOP and deduct the contributions used to repay
the loan;24
4. As a bargaining tool during union negotiations, especially for a
financially-troubled company (e.g., stock-for-concessions deals in
the airline industry, such as the United Airlines transaction) .25
This comment focuses on the use of ESOPs to give employees
stock in exchange for wage concessions because this has been
the primary motive for awarding employee ownership in the air-
line industry. This basic understanding of ESOPs provides a ba-
sis from which to examine the details of the United Airlines
transaction.
B. THE UNITED BUYOUT
The fifth time was finally the charm for United Airlines em-
ployees. On July 12, 1994, following four unsuccessful attempts
at an employee buyout since 1987, seventy percent of the share-
holders approved a plan to sell fifty-five percent of the airline to
certain employee groups in return for wage concessions from
the participating employees.26 Apparently, the shareholders ap-
proved the buyout27 this time to avoid a likely but unpopular
alternative: sales of corporate assets and layoffs of thousands of
workers.2 8 Poor financial results experienced by United in the
early nineties would have eventually forced United's manage-
ment to implement such measures to cut costs and improve li-
quidity.29 From 1991-93, United's losses totalled $1.3 billion. 0
United structured the buyout with the following terms:
1. Participating employee groups, approximately fifty-four thou-
sand of United's seventy-six thousand total employees, received a
23 Moberly, supra note 21, at 773. One commentator estimated that this is the
most common use of ESOPs, probably accounting for at least one-third of all
plans. See Rosen & Quarrey, supra note 22, at 127.
24 Moberly, supra note 21, at 773.
25 Id. Although as of 1985 this use of an ESOP only accounted for about 2% of
the total ESOPs in the U.S., such a transaction usually involves very large compa-
nies and saving many jobs. Id.
26 McCarthy & Quintanilla, supra note 1, at A3.
27 Shareholder approval was the last step in authorizing the transaction. The
board of directors and the two major participating union groups-the pilots and
mechanics-had already voted to approve the stock-for-concessions buyout.
28 McCarthy & Quintanilla, supra note 1, at A3.
29 Id. at A3, A6.
s0 Castro, supra note 4, at 46.
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fifty-five percent equity stake in UAL Corporation, United Air-
lines' parent company;31
2. United.gave its existing shareholders $84.81 in cash and a half
share of new UAL common stock for each share of common
stock that they heldat the time of the buyout;32
3. United financed the transaction by issuing $741 million of de-
bentures due in 10 to 20 years, and $400 million of preferred
stock;3
4. Through September 30, 1994, United incurred pre-tax costs of
$169 million in connection with its "Employee Investment
Transaction ,;34
5. Participating employees were entitled to elect three out of the
twelve members of UAL's board of directors; 5
6. Two of United's top executives were forced to resign, and par-
ticipating employees picked the new chairman and chief execu-
tive officer, Gerald Greenwald;36
7. Participating employees agreed to more than 5 years of wage
cuts (ranging from 8.25% to 15.7%) and certain work rule
changes, which United's management expects to save the airline
approximately $3.3 billion over the nearly 6-year period of the
buyout contract;3 7
8. Participating union employees are protected from layoffs and
they must approve certain asset sales, and restrictions were
placed on certain operations of United. 8
Specifically, the buyout's purpose was to "put in place a lower
cost structure which is designed to allow United to compete ef-
fectively against low-cost carriers currently influencing the do-
mestic marketplace and improve UAL's long-term financial
3' Ziemba, supra note 1, at 1. United will ratably allocate the 55% equity inter-
est to individual employee accounts through the year 2000. UNITED AIRLINES
CORP., SEC FoRM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTER ENDED SEPT. 30, 1994 18. The entire
55%, however, can presently be voted by the ESOP trustee at the direction of,
and on behalf of, the employees participating in the ESOPs. Id. Therefore, this
Comment treats the employees as presently owning 55% of the airline.
32 UAL CORP., supra note 31, at 24.
33 Id. at 15.
34 Id. at 11.
35 James Ott, Vote Sets UAL on New Course, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 18,
1994, at 20, 21.
36 James Ott, Workers Take Expensive Risk With Their Airline, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., July 18, 1994, at 20. United had to make golden parachute pay-
ments to former chairman Stephen M. Wolf and former president and chief op-
erating officer John Pope in amounts of $20 million and $16 million,
respectively. Id.
37 Michael J. McCarthy, Risky Flight Plan: Unlike Rival Airlines, United is Setting
Off on Costly Expansion, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1995, at Al.
38 Ott, supra note 35, at 20.
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viability."3 9 United plans on using the labor savings produced
from the buyout to fund "Shuttle by United," a short-haul low-
fare airline that began competing with Southwest Airlines on
the West Coast on October 1, 1994.40 This is an important stra-
tegic move for United because low-cost carriers in short-haul
markets, such as Southwest Airlines, increased their share of the
U.S. market from nineteen percent to thirty percent during
1992-93.41
Wall Street appears cautious about United's buyout and its in-
vestment in United Shuttle. During the 7 months following the
buyout, the price of UAL's stock increased only 3.5%, compared
to 64% and 21% increases for Northwest Airlines and Delta Air
Lines, respectively.42 Investors seem skeptical, despite the fact
that UAL posted a net income of $51 million in 1994, compared
with a $50 million loss in 1993.13 United's management attrib-
utes the skepticism to its unusual degree of employee owner-
ship, as summed up by its manager of investor relations: "We're
the airline stock the Street loves to hate."44 Investor also may be
worried by the rapid exhaustion of the labor savings due to
higher fuel costs, expenses associated with the United Shuttle
expansion, and higher rental and landing fees at the new Den-
ver airport.45
The substance of the United buyout was basically the same as
any issuance of stock, except the investors were United's em-
ployees and they paid for their stock with paycheck reductions
over approximately a five-year period. Theoretically, the pres-
ent value of the wage concessions is equal to the value of the
stock awarded to employees. Because it is too early to judge the
wisdom of the United buyout, the next section examine's em-
ployee ownership of other airlines to determine whether those
buyouts were effective in improving those airlines.
39 UAL CORP., supra note 31, at 18.
4o Id.
41 Del Jones & Julie Schmit, Airline Employees Taking Over: UAL Plan May Put
Industry in New Hands, USA TODAY, Dec. 20, 1993, at 1, B2.
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III. HISTORY OF EMPLOYEE-OWNED AIRLINES
A. BACKGROUND OF U.S. AIRL[NE INDUSTRY
Before discussing the history of employee-owned airlines, it is
helpful to discuss briefly the history of the U.S. airline industry
over the last two decades. Prior to the deregulation of the air-
line industry in 1978, airline unions successfully negotiated high
wages and good benefits for their members. 6 The airlines toler-
ated the high labor costs because they could pass the costs on to
passengers. 47 Following deregulation, however, airlines (espe-
cially weaker carriers) began to feel the pressure of high labor
costs from the old union contracts because the airlines could no
longer pass the costs on to passengers as easily.48 This environ-
ment led to experimentation in methods for reducing labor
costs.
At Eastern Air Lines, management first attempted to simply
approach the unions and ask them for wage reductions.49 The
employees, who had enjoyed regular wage increases prior to de-
regulation, were unreceptive to management's request.50 Next,
Eastern successfully implemented a plan that reduced employ-
ees' wages, but the reduction constituted a "loan" to the airline,
which Eastern would have to repay if the company made a cer-
tain profit.51 After a few years during which Eastern made only
minimal profits, employees refused to continue entering into
such profit-sharing arrangements. 52
Continental Airlines tried a more indirect approach to reduce
its labor costs. In 1983, Continental declared bankruptcy in or-
der to get out of its union contracts and then rehired workers at
approximately half of their previous wages.53 Continental re-
duced the salaries of its pilots from $77,000 to $43,000, and the
salaries of its flight attendants from $29,000 to $14,000. 54 Cur-
46 Beverly Smaby, Cooperation vs. Competition at Eastern Air Lines, 23 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 29, 29-30 (1988).
47 Id.





53 Id. at 31.
54 Kathryn A. English, Updating the Mandatory-Permissive Distinction to Enable Un-
ions to Protect the Job Security and Economic Interests of Their Members, 20 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 573, 579 (1993-94).
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rent laws prevent companies from using this type of tactic to
break labor contracts. 55
"Double breasting" was another method used in the post-de-
regulation airline industry to reduce the costs of unionized la-
bor.56 Double breasting involves restructuring an airline by
forming a subsidiary corporation that denies recognition to an
incumbent union at the parent or sister corporation.5 7 The
problem with double breasting, however, was the autonomy re-
quirements that the non-union subsidiary airline had to meet in
order to avoid being bound to the existing present corporation
labor contract.5 8
The methods for reducing labor costs mentioned above either
failed initially or are no longer viable alternatives for airlines.
Continuing the pursuit of lower labor costs, United is leading
the U.S. airlines in the latest trend-awarding stock to employ-
ees in return for wage concessions. But while the scope of the
United buyout may be a bit unprecedented, the following sec-
tion demonstrates that employee ownership is nothing new to
the U.S. airline industry.
B. PAST EXPERIENCES IN EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP OF AIRLINES
Along with United, several other U.S. airlines that are still in
business have granted partial ownership to their employees.
The following list of major airlines that feature employee owner-
ship shows the amount of ownership distributed to employees,
and, if ownership arose through a buyout, the year in which the
buyout took place:
55 Paul S. Dempsey, Employees Can't Save Airline Industry, USA TODAY, Aug. 23,
1994, at All.
56 John V. Jansonius & Kenneth E. Broughton, Coping with Deregulation: Reduc-
tion of Labor Costs in the Airline Industry, 49J. AIR L. & COM. 501, 504-05 (1984).
57 Id. at 505-06.
58 Id. at 506.
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Airline Employee Ownership Buyout Year
United Airlines 55% 1994
Northwest Airlines 33%59 1993
America West 30%60 Gradual
Trans World Airlines (TWA) 30%6 1  1993
Southwest Airlines 13%62 Gradual
Several other airlines that experimented with employee
ownership in the past either went bankrupt or were taken over,
sometimes fairly compensating, the employee-owners. The
largest such airlines and the highest employee ownership
percentages that they achieved are listed below: 63
Airlines Peak Employee Ownership
Western Airlines 33%
Eastern Air Lines 25%
Pacific Southwest Airlines 15%
Republic Airlines 15%
Pan American World Airways 13%
Continental 9%
To provide insight on the U.S. airline industry's experience
with employee ownership, the following subsections examine
three airlines that have had varying degrees of success with
employee ownership: Eastern Air Lines, TWA, and Kiwi
International Air Lines.
L Eastern Air Lines
In December 1983, Eastern granted employees 25% of its vot-
ing stock in return for $292 million in wage concessions, pro-
ductivity improvements worth an additional $75 million,64 and
59 Del Jones, United Deal Means More Low Air Fares, USA TODAY, July 13, 1994, at
Al, A2. This percentage will increase to 37.5% within 10 years. Jones & Schmit,
supra note 41, at B2.
60 Jones & Schmit, supra note 41, at B2. This percentage approximates the
amount of employee ownership prior to America West entering bankruptcy
protection. Id. America West had required all new hires to use 20% of their first-
year salary to purchase its stock, but the employees' equity interest was wiped out
in bankruptcy proceedings. James S. Hirsch, Debt-Burdened America West Seeks a
Safe Landing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1992, at B4.
61 TWA Exits Chapter 11; Creditors Get Bigger Stake, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 1995, at
A6.
62 Bridget O'Brian, Southwest Wins Pilots Accord Offering No Wage Boost in First
Five of 10 Years, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1994, at A2.
63 Richard Tomkins, A Triumph of Hope Over Experience-The Background to United
Airlines'Employee Ownership Dea FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 20, 1993, at 17.




18% pay reductions. 65 In addition, each of the four participat-
ing labor groups-pilots, flight attendants, mechanics and non-
contract workers received a seat on Eastern's twenty-seat board
of directors. 66 Eastern also implemented "codetermination"-
opportunities for employee representatives to reviewjointly with
management items such as company books and the business
plan.67
This stock-for-concessions trade failed to save Eastern. In
1984, the first year following the buyout, Eastern benefited
greatly from the reduced labor costs and productivity improve-
ments, while labor-management relations also began improv-
ing.68 At the end of 1984, however, despite his promise ofjoint
problem solving, Eastern's chairman "unilaterally extended the
wage concessions fee another year," causing a total collapse in
labor-management relations and codetermination. 69 The un-
ions and management could not agree on further concessions,
and the airline began a spiralling descent.70 Frank Lorenzo
bought Eastern in 1986, and under his ownership poor labor
relations led to a strike and several failed employee buyout at-
tempts, until the company filed bankruptcy in 1990. Finally, in
January 1991, losses of $2 billion over the past 22 months forced
Eastern to cease operations permanently. 71
At the time of the employee buyout, Eastern was probably be-
yond saving. Poor customer service and loss of reputation, re-
sulting from years of labor wars, had already cost Eastern
hundreds of millions of dollars in passenger revenues.72 But
some observers argue that employee ownership might have sal-
vaged Eastern, "were it not for the particularly poisoned atmos-
phere between the headstrong individuals."73
65 Smaby, supra note 46, at 32.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 JOSEPH R. BLASI & DOUGLAS L. KRUSE, THE NEW OWNERS: THE MASS EMER-
GENCE OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP IN PUBLIC COMPANIES AND WHAT IT MEANS TO
AMERICAN BUSINESS 102 (1991). The machinists' union committees alone were
responsible for estimated productivity gains of $30 million in the first year of
employee ownership. COTrON, supra note 9, at 41.
69 BLAsI & KRUSE, supra note 68, at 102.
70 Id.
71 James L. Linsey, Labor Perspectives on the Airline Implosion, C656 ALI-ABA 269,
271 (1991).
72 Smaby, supra note 46, at 31-32.
73 BLASI & KRUSE, supra note 68, at 103.
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In addition to Eastern's poor financial position, employee
ownership failed because neither the employees nor manage-
ment viewed employee ownership as an opportunity to genu-
inely work together to improve the airline. Management merely
viewed the employee ownership as "a bridge to permanent wage
concessions," while employees simply thought of it as "a way of
securing lost wages. "74 But at least one commentator suggests
that if Eastern had implemented employee ownership earlier, it
may have worked-it simply required time to change the old
views of both management and the employees.75
2. TWA
TWA, the nation's seventh-largest airline, has filed for Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy twice in the last four years. 76 TWA emerged
from its first bankruptcy proceeding in November 1993 by
awarding its employees forty-five percent ownership in return
for wage concessions. 77 Prior to entering bankruptcy protec-
tion, TWA had experienced periods where it lost almost $1 mil-
lion a day.78 Similar to Eastern, TWA was in severe financial
difficulties at the time it implemented the employee buyout,
and employee ownership has probably not yet been in place
long enough to make a substantial difference. Expected cost
savings and revenues from the buyout have yet to materialize,
and TWA has abandoned its expansion plans for an Atlanta hub,
retreating to its single domestic hub in St. Louis.79 After watch-
ing its stock price decline by more than fifty percent during one
six-month period in 1994, some industry executives believe that
TWA has few options left except slashing its work force of more
than twenty-five thousand employees.8 °
TWA saw a glimmer of hope in the fall of 1994 when its three
major union groups-mechanics, pilots, and flight attendants-
agreed to new wage concessions, which management hoped
would save TWA approximately $130 million a year in operating
74 Smaby, supra note 46, at 34.
75 Id. at 34-35.
76 TWA Exits Chapter 11; Creditors Get Bigger Stake, supra note 61, at A6.
77 Michael J. McCarthy, TWA, Out of Bankruptcy Court, Struggles to Take Off,
WALL ST. J., July 27, 1994, at B6.
78 Edwin McDowell, TWA Closes in on Deal for Employee Buyout, S.F. CHRON., Aug.
25, 1992, at Dl.




costs."1 The new contracts were part of an overall restructuring
that TWA claimed was necessary for it to fly through the winter
of 1994-95.82 Possibly the employees were more willing to accept
another round of concessions because of their forty-five percent
ownership stake in the airline. TWA emerged from its second
Chapter 11 filing in August 1995 by increasing creditors' stake
in the airline from 55% percent to 65%, in exchange for the
creditors forgiving $500 million of debt.8 3 This reorganization
reduced the employees' ownership percentage from forty-five
percent to approximately thirty percent.8 4 TWA's financial sta-
tus is still questionable because of more than $1 billion of debt,
an expensive older fleet, and limited domestic and foreign
routes.85
Though still struggling financially, TWA has improved in cer-
tain areas that may be attributable to its employee ownership.
TWA has improved its customer service by such means as remov-
ing seats to increase legroom. Improved service has helped TWA
earn the top ranking for customer satisfaction among domestic
carriers for long flights, and second place for shorter flights in a
1993 survey of frequent business travellers.86 Before it became
forty-five percent employee-owned, TWA had the worst com-
plaint record in the industry. 7 Also, since implementation of
employee ownership, some TWA flight crews have "giv[en] up
their spare time to take part in promotional tours for the airline
around U.S. travel agencies."8 8 But TWA is fighting an uphill
battle, according to several analysts.8 9
3. Kiwi International Air Lines
In 1993, former employees of Eastern Air Lines and Pan
American World Airways, both now defunct, founded a new one
hundred percent employee-owned airline, Kiwi International
81 TWA's Debt Restructuring Plan Wins Approval From Pension Agency, DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA), Dec. 28, 1994, at Al, A2.
82 Julius A. Karash, TWA, Workers Accept Contract; New Cost-Cutting Deal to Help
Airline in Restructuring, KAN. Crry STAR, Nov. 5, 1994, at B2.
83 TWA Exits Chapter 11; Creditors Get Bigger Stake, supra note 61, at A6.
8 Id.
85 Id.
86 McCarthy, supra note 77, at B6 (based on survey byJ.D. Power & Associates).
87 Jones & Schmit, supra note 41, at B2 (during period from 1985-92).
88 Tomkins, supra note 63, at 17.
89 McDowell, supra note 78, at Dl.
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Air Lines (Kiwi).9° Kiwi has a fleet of sixteen planes that it uses
to make seventy-three flights a day between the seven cities that
it serves. 91 "[D]espite its award-winning service and one of the
lowest cost structures in the [industry]," Kiwi lost $24 million in
1994 and nearly filed for bankruptcy in December 1994.92 In
that same month Kiwi voluntarily grounded its entire fleet after
the FAA questioned its record-keeping regarding pilot
training.
93
Kiwi's problems continued in 1995, when it replaced its
founder and chairman, and two other top executives left.94
Although the airline made its first profit in the first half of 1995,
its load factor (percentage of seats filled) was only 53%-well
below the industry average of 66.2%. 95
Kiwi has sought to build employee loyalty through the man-
ner in which it implemented employee ownership. When Kiwi
fills a position, the new hire must buy between $5,000 to $50,000
of Kiwi stock, depending on the position.96 Employees demon-
strated their loyalty during the crisis in December 1994, when
they agreed to temporary salary reductions in order to reduce
operating expenses.97
Despite their sizeable investments, however, Kiwi's employees
have no voice in the management of the airline because a voting
trust of seven pilot-directors makes all key management deci-
sions.98 Kiwi's current chairman summarized the three years
which the voting trust managed the airline with the following
remarks: "Pilots have always wanted to run an airline. Well, this
was the first one they ran. And it was the first one they screwed
up."99 Recognizing this problem, the pilots have promised to
give more control to Kiwi's new chief executive officer, who
90 Kiwi Resumes Flights After FAA Probe, UPI, Dec. 18, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Wires File.
9' Carl Quintanilla, Kiwi's Pilots Are Bailing Out of the Company Cockpit, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 19, 1995, at B4.
92 Id.
93 Kiwi Chairman Quits Carrier Amid Shakeup, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1995, at B1l.
94 Carl Quintanilla, Kiwi Appoints Murphy as CEO and President, WALL ST.J., Aug.
25, 1995, at B12.
95 Id.
9 Schrmit, supra note 7, at BI.
97 Anne E. Tergesen, Low Fare Airlines Hit Turbulence, THE REc., Dec. 9, 1994, at
Cl.




stated "I think one needs to recognize that this company is em-
ployee-run, but you need to run it as a business."100
As the experiences at Eastern and TWA demonstrate, the im-
plementation of employee ownership does not magically trans-
form a troubled airline into a healthy one. While it is too early
to judge the success of Kiwi's employee ownership, the growing
pangs that it has suffered demonstrate the problems caused by a
single employee group dominating the management of an air-
line. Because the number of airlines that have implemented
employee ownership on a large scale is limited, the next section
will look at some companies in other industries that have had
more experience with employee ownership.
IV. HISTORY OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP
IN OTHER INDUSTRIES
As employee ownership of American companies has in-
creased, there has been much debate regarding the conditions
necessary for employee ownership to succeed, and the fre-
quency with which employee-owned companies do succeed.
Professor Alan Hyde refers to the extreme positions of the de-
bate as the "always" and "never" schools of thought as to how
often employee ownership will benefit a company.101 Professor
Hyde points out that it is difficult for the never school to explain
the diversity of several of the industries that feature employee-
owned business, such as plywood manufacturing, refuse collec-
tion, steel manufacturing, professional partnerships, taxi cab
collectives, construction companies, and supermarkets.1 0 2 Suc-
cessful employee ownership and management occur in the pro-
duction of goods and services, among educated and less-
educated employees, in jobs performing tasks both simple and
complex, and in enterprises of varying size.' 0 3 ,
Professor Hyde also points out that it is difficult for the always
school to explain why employee-owned firms seldom dominate
entire industries, except where the law prohibits alternative ar-
rangements, such as law firms.10 4 The always school has several
explanations for employee ownership's failure to dominate a
100 Id.
101 Alan Hyde, The Kenneth M. Piper Lecture: In Defense of Employee Own-
ership, Given at Chicago-Kent College of Law (Mar. 19, 1991), in 67 CHI.-KEN" L.
REv. 159, 164 (1991).
102 Id. at 168.
103 Id. at 169.
T04 Id. at 170-71.
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particular industry, such as tradition and lack of awareness of
options.105 Professor Hyde's analysis seems to illustrate that em-
ployee ownership is no panacea for all companies in every indus-
try, but it does have the potential to work in many diverse
circumstances, subject tothe specific operating environment of
the particular company considering employe@ ownership. This
section proceeds on this assumption and considers different
case studies in employee ownership, keeping in mind that there
are limitations in extrapolating the likelihood of success in em-
ployee ownership based on other companies' experiences.
A. R4- r PA CKZG Co
Rath Packing Company of Waterloo, Iowa was one of the first
industrial plants to be worker-owned and controlled.10 6
Although Rath enjoyed a reputation as one of the most.modern
meatpackers in the industry during the 1940s, poor manage-
ment decisions and lack of capital investment had placed Rath
on the brink of closing its plant by the late seventies.1 0 7 In 1979,
the 2,200 union employees of Rath took wage cuts and deferred
benefits in return for 60% of the company's treasury stock. 10 8
This new equity enabled leverage for Rath to obtain loans from
several government agencies for capital investment.10 9 The
union had numerous reasons for acquiring control of Rath: sav-
ing jobs, limiting concessions, gaining control of management
decision-making, protecting the pension plan, and preventing a
proposed buyout that would have included drastic wage and
benefit cuts without giving the union or employees any control
over the company. 110
While Rath adopted ownership for its employees through an
ESOP, management instituted additional mechanisms for al-
lowing worker participation and control."' Rath created a top
level steering committee, jointly chaired by union and manage-
ment officials, which met monthly with a strategic planning
105 Id. at 171.
106 Toni Delmonte, In Defense of Union Involvement in Worker Ownership, 10 IN
PUB. INTEREST 14, 16 (1990).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 17.
109 Id.
110 Deborah G. Olson, Union Experiences With Worker Ownership: Legal and Practi-
cal Issues Raised by ESOPs, TRASOPs, Stock Purchases and Co-Operatives, 1982 Wis. L.
REv. 729, 754.
M Delmonte, supra note 106, at 17.
654
EMPLOYEE-OWNED AIRLINES
group to monitor developments and to oversee the future of the
company. 1 2 Rath provided its employees with the opportunity
to join Action Research Teams, in which discussion and prob-
lem solving were open to all topics related to the management
of the company."'
Unfortunately, employee ownership did not save Rath, which
ceased operations and liquidated its assets in 1985.114 The em-
ployee buyout had yielded a twenty percent reduction in labor
costs per unit of production, yet labor costs were only fifteen
percent of Rath's total costs." 5 External conditions, such as
high interest rates, non-union competition, and outdated plant
and marketing strategies contributed significantly to Rath's
downfall. 1 6
Rath also demonstrates the strain that can develop when a
union representative sits on the company's board of directors.
The president of Rath's predominant union ultimately became
president of Rath after he chose not to run for re-election as
union president.1 7 Soon thereafter, Rath successfully con-
vinced a bankruptcy court to void the firm's contract with the
union."" This does not necessarily imply that Rath's president
"sold out" his former union and its members, because voiding
the union contract might have benefitted the employees and
the company."' Surely, however, during his transition from
union to corporate president, he experienced divided loyalty be-
tween union employees, other employees, and the best long-
term interests of the company and its non-employee
shareholders.
B. WEIrTON STEL CORP.
Weirton Steel Corporation, in Weirton, West Virginia, was an-
other pioneer in employee ownership, although it is still strug-
gling to survive in the competitive United States steel industry.
In 1984, when employees gained control of seventy-five percent
of the stock, Weirton became the largest employee-owned com-
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 18.
115 Id.
116 Delmonte, supra note 106, at 18.
117 Michael C. Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargaining with Employee Supervision
of Management, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 62 (1988).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 63.
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pany in the United States in terms of employees. 12 0 Weirton is
currently the seventh-largest steel producer and ninth-largest
employee-owned company in the U.S., employing approxi-
mately six thousand employees. 12 '
Weirton has experienced several difficulties during its first ten
years of employee ownership. Some of Weirton's recent
problems include: a lawsuit filed by employees against manage-
ment, fire damaging a mill, cyclical demand for steel, losses of
$336.8 million over the past 3 years, and remaining debt from a
major modernization program.122
Despite these problems, some Wall Street analysts are optimis-
tic about Weirton's future.1 2 1 One analyst has attributed Weir-
ton's reduced employee headcount and improved productivity,
each better than industry averages, to employee ownership.1 24
Employees have made the following sacrifices to improve Weir-
ton's financial condition: cuts in pay and profit sharing, job
eliminations, dilution of their control in stock from 75% to
50%, and acceptance of a managed health care plan expected to
cut costs by $28 million over the next 3 years.'2 5 Investors
showed support for Weirton through a successful offering of 15
million new shares of common stock in August 1994, which
raised $117.5 million in badly needed new capital.' 26
Other industrial companies have had mixed success with em-
ployee ownership. The three hundred employee-owners at To-
ledo's Textileather Corp. earned tens of thousands of dollars
when their company was sold to a privately-held Canadian
firm.127 But workers at Northwestern Steel & Wire Co. in Ster-
ling, Illinois took big wage cuts during its 1988 employee
buyout, only to watch their fifty-nine percent stock ownership
fall to eighteen percent. 2
120 Len Boselovic, Steeled for the Future; Weirton Steel Enters its Second Decade with
CEO Elish at Helm-and Employees at the Rudder, PITTSBURGH POsT-GAZETTE, Sept.
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In the past, many experts regarded Avis Rent-A-Car, the
fourth-largest company in the country that is majority-owned by
its employees, 12 and the largest fully employee-owned com-
pany,' 30 as a model of success in employee ownership. 3 1
United's non-union employees showed their confidence in
Avis's employee ownership by selectingJoe Vittoria, Avis's chair-
man and CEO, as their representative on the UAL board of
directors.132
Avis's recent problems, however, have caused observers to
doubt the success of its employee ownership. The nation's sec-
ond-largest car rental company has suffered scattered layoffs,
.frozen salaries, and a fifty percent reduction in the value of its
stock during 1994.'13
Avis recognized that creating the right attitude regarding the
employees' new role was essential to Avis's successful buyout.
"The company created employee participation groups (EPGs),
in which managers function as facilitators but all employees play
a role."134 The managers took on roles resembling coaches
more than traditional managers, and over a five-year-period Avis
changed the "us and them" attitude to an atmosphere of team-
work and open communication among the different employee
groups. 35 Avis believes that this environment is responsible for
such instances as a Philadelphia employee introducing a new
way to keep cars locked and safe overnight, and a Palm Beach
employee fixing a flat tire for an individual who was driving a
competitor's car. 136
Despite management's receptiveness to employees' ideas, the
12,800 employee-owners have no direct representation on Avis's
12-member board of directors. 3 7 They have no voting rights be-
cause a trustee holds their stock until after they leave the com-
129 Top Employee-Owned Firms, supra note 3, at lB.
130 James S. Hirsch, Avis Employees Find Stock Ownership Is Mixed Blessing, WALL
ST. J., May 2, 1995, at B1.
131 Alan Fredericks, Avis' Vittoria Tapped for Role in UAL's Switch in Ownership,
TRAVEL WKLY., July 21, 1994, at 1.
132 Id.
133 Hirsch, supra note 130, at B1.
134 Fredericks, supra note 131, at 1.
135 Id.
136 Robert L. Rose & Erie Norton, ESOP Fables: UAL Worker-Owners May Face
Bumpy Ride if the Past is a Guide, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1994, at Al.
137 Hirsch, supra note 130, at B1.
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pany.138  Also, Avis refuses to disclose certain financial
information to employees, such as executives' salaries and bo-
nuses.1 3 9 One Avis director defends this policy on the basis that
many of the employees would not understand the informa-
tion. 4 ° Such an attitude by Avis's management may account for
the low morale the employees are currently experiencing.14 1
In addition to the problems that Avis has encountered in im-
plementing employee ownership, United faces several addi-
tional challenges. Avis was a privately-held company
approximately one-sixth the size of United at the time of Avis's
buyout. 141 United's sheer size makes it more difficult for em-
ployees to feel as if they can individually contribute to the com-
pany's success. Another difference is the fact that 100%'of Avis's
employees participated in its buyout, while so far only 54,000 of
United's 76,000 total employees have participated in that
buyout.143 Also, unlike many employee buyouts, including
United's, Avis employees did not have to give up wages or pen-
sion benefits to buy their company. 44 Perhaps the biggest dif-
ference, however, is the intense competitiveness of the airline
industry and its current weakened financial condition that re-
sulting from years of net losses.
The common thread among these three non-airline case stud-
ies in employee ownership may be the employees improved atti-
tudes and willingness to sacrifice after the buyouts, although
Avis's morale has suffered recently. Employees' sacrifices almost
certainly extended the time that Rath was able to remain in busi-
ness, and Weirton's employee-owners probably deserve credit
for enabling their company to withstand tough times. But Rath,
Weirton, and Avis demonstrate that certain adverse external fac-
tors can weaken or destroy a company in spite of employee co-
operation. Airline employees who are deciding whether to
accept concessions-for-stock deals should be aware of this reality.
138 Id. Employees who quit Avis must wait six years for their shares. Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Hirsch, supra note 130, at B1.
142 Fredericks, supra note 131, at 1.
143 Id.; Rose & Norton, supra note 136, at Al.
144 Hirsch, supra note 130, at Bi.
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V. ADVANTAGES OF EMPLOYEE-OWNED AIRLINES
A. LOWER LABOR COSTS
Labor costs have been one of the most significant factors in
putting the airline industry in the red. On average, wages and
benefits account for approximately thirty precent of airline op-
erating expenses.14 Professor Paul Dempsey lists low wages and
flexible work rules among his nine "survival characteristics" of
U.S. airlines. 146 A spokesman for American Airlines has con-
cluded that "costs are going to be the principal competitive ad-
vantage of the 1990s.' 47 Reducing labor costs was certainly the
primary motivation for the United buyout, which should yield
significant labor savings over the five year period covered by the
buyout agreement.
As noted above, prior to deregulation airlines allowed the un-
ions to negotiate high wages and benefits, because the airlines
could pass the costs on to customers. Airline workers became
some of the highest paid employees in American industry, with
many pilots making over $100,000 a year for flying less than
eighty hours a month, and even baggage handlers making over
$30,000 a year.' 48 But since deregulation in 1978, and since
competition has driven down fares, airlines have been scram-
bling to cut costs-especially labor costs. The older airlines,
with a long history of collective bargaining, have found it diffi-
cult to compete with new airlines paying substantially lower
wages and enjoying greater flexibility in areas such as employee
scheduling and job assignments. 4 9
United is hoping that the wage concessions obtained in the
buyout will bring its costs more in line with the low-cost industry
leader-Southwest Airlines. Southwest enjoys a low 7.2 cents
per available seat-mile (the cost of flying one passenger one
145 Jeffrey M. Laderman, Bulls on the Runway Start to Bellow, Bus. WK., Aug. 8,
1994, at 63. This percentage, however, appears to be decreasing, as demon-
strated by the decrease from 37.3% to 33.8% from 1980-90. Paul S. Dempsey, The
Disintegration of the U.S. Airline Industry, 20 TRAqsp. LJ. 9, 27 n.63 (1991).
146 The rest of Dempsey's list includes: multiple hubs, strategically located; fre-
quent flier programs; computer reservation systems; sophisticated yield manage-
ment; fuel efficient fleet of standardized aircraft; low debt (conservative growth);
superior service; and international routes. Dempsey, supra note 145, at 14.
147 Terry Maxon, Southwest Pilots Trade Raises for Stock, DALLAs MORNING NEWS,
Nov. 18, 1994, at 4D.
148 Michael A. Katz, The American Experience. Under the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978-An Airline Perspective, 6 HOFSRA LAB. LJ. 87, 92 (1988).
149 Jansonius & Broughton, supra note 56, at 552-53.
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mile), compared to United's pre-buyout cost of 9.3 cents.1"'
United's new airline-within-an-airline, United Shuttle, is aiming
for 7.4 cents per available seat-mile, a sharp reduction in costs
made possible by the employee buyout.15 1 After achieving com-
parable costs, United Shuttle hopes that its low fares, amenities
and broader frequent flier perks will draw customers from
Southwest, despite Southwest's more frequent flights. 15 2 The
ability to compete sucessfully with Southwest is vital to United's
future, because competition with Southwest in 20% of United's
markets turned what would have been a $700 million profit into
a $1 billion loss for United in 1992.15
Although United will enjoy lower labor costs over the next five
years, it will have to reckon with the issue of employee wages
again after the five-year buyout period expires. United will
surely want to maintain the lower labor costs that it enjoyed dur-
ing the buyout period, but it will have to find a new bargaining
incentive to offer the employees because offering more stock
will probably not be an attractive inducement. United publicly
acknowledged this challenge in a list of factors upon which the
success of the buyout was dependent, including "enduring cost
savings through.., the renegotiation of labor agreements at the
end of the investment period... ,,154
B. PRODUCTMiTY GAINS
This section discusses another major reason for awarding em-
ployee ownership of an airline-arguably employees will work
harder and smarter. Following a buyout, employees not only
have their jobs riding on the survival of the airline, but their
compensation and pensions depend on its survival and
profitability.
150 Kenneth Labich, Will United Fly?, FORTUNE, Aug. 22, 1994, at 70.
151 Wendy Zellner et al., Dogfight Over California, Bus. WK., Aug. 15, 1994, at 32.
152 Id.
153 Labich, supra note 150, at 70.
154 UNITED AIR LINES INC., SEC FoRM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTER ENDED SEPT. 30,
1994 18. United also cited the following factors:
[T]he state of the competitive environment in the airline industry,
competitive responses to United's efforts, United's ability, to
achieve enduring cost savings through productivity improvements
... and, in the case of the Shuttle by United, United's ability to
deliver a product which is competitive in both qualitative and price
terms and which is accepted by the marketplace.
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Although there is only a limited amount of empirical evi-
dence, and what is available is disputed by commentators or con-
tradicted by other studies, several studies performed in the late
seventies and early eighties reached the following conclusions
about the companies sampled in the respective survey:
1. Companies with ESOPs were 150% as profitable as comparable
conventional companies without them;
2. Over a five-year period, employee ownership companies had
twice the average annual productivity rate of comparable conven-
tional companies studied;
3. Majority employee-owned companies generated three times
more net new jobs than comparable conventional companies; 155
4. Companies featuring ESOPs with high worker participation
grew 11% to 17% faster than similar firms with little or no worker
involvement (although only one-fourth of ESOPs actually in-
crease worker participation in the company)."5 6
Although commentators have attacked the credibility of such
limited empirical evidence, one concept appears fairly uniform:
a company should combine employee ownership with greater
employee participation in the management of the company to
maximize gains in productivity. 57 Mere partial ownership of the
company may not be enough to motivate employees to make the
necessary changes required to increase productivity. Michael
Quarrey and Corey Rosen, who analyzed the results of nine ma-
jor studies of employee ownership's impact on corporate per-
formance, stressed this concept when they summarized their
findings:
The studies come to a very clear consensus. Employee ownership
can, in fact, substantially improve corporate performance, but
only when combined with 'participative management' programs.
By this, the researchers mean programs for employees to have
regular and meaningful input into decisions affecting-their work.
Self-managing teams, employee participation groups, employee
advisory committees, and similar structures are often used to ac-
complish this. Absent this input, employee ownership has no
consistent impact on performance. This does not suggest, how-
ever, that employee participation itself is adequate. The research
155 Moberly, supra note 21, at 774.
156 Alex Kotlowitz & Ed Bean, Spate of Corporate Buy-Outs by ESOPs Raises Ques-
tions of Benefits to Workers, WAL. ST. J., Sept. 30, 1987.
157 Hyde, supra note 101, at 173.
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on the impact of participation on performance is ambiguous, in-
dicating that it will have an impact only in some cases.'58
Professor Hyde also believes that productivity increases from
employee ownership are more apparent in companies that have
experienced past conflicts between management and labor,
such as United and most of the other airlines. 59 United is
surely hoping that employee ownership will improve service in-
dicators such as their on-time performance, which has suffered
in the past because of distractions related to failed buyout at-
tempts and labor disputes. 60
A company may also experience increased productivity when
employee ownership motivates employees to not only reduce
their own "shirking"-which includes goofing off, and, in a
broader sense, not taking opportunities for improving their em-
ployer-but also to monitor other employees.' 6' Employee own-
ership may have the effect of an extra layer of supervision over
employees, without the extra labor costs of additional supervi-
sors. In addition, workers with an ownership stake should be
more likely to invest in firm-specific education or other invest-
ments of their time, energy, or savings that are specific to the
firm. 162 Such firm-specific investments by employees may also
reduce turnover, resulting in additional productivity gains by
not having to continuously train new employees.
At least one commentator has questioned, however, the as-
sumption that productivity increases with employee ownership
of a company for four reasons:
1. Employees may become discouraged and discontinue perform-
ing their job as efficiently as possible after watching outside mar-
ket forces cause declines in the company's stock price, despite
lower labor costs and productivity gains resulting from the em-
ployee ownership;
2. After noticing that other employees have become more con-
cerned with reducing waste, certain employees may become less
concerned (because someone else is worrying about productiv-
ity), offsetting the others' gains;
158 MICHAEL QUARRY & COREY M. ROSEN, THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE
OWNERSHIP, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 1 (1995).
159 Hyde, supra note 101, at 174.
o60 Judith Valente & Randall Smith, United Effort: Unions' Bid for UAL Requires
Less Debt But Carries New Risks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1990, at Al.
161 Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms,
Codetermination, and Economic. Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1761-62 (1990).
162 Hyde, supra note 101, at 201.
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3. The amount of stock held in the employee's individual ac-
count will probably be small, which will affect their perception of
the ESOP's reward;
4. The exclusion of employees from ESOP investment choices
and the lack of full information disclosure to the employees is
likely to reduce motivation. 16 3
C. IMPROVED EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
Employee ownership may also improve employee relations
within a company. This intangible benefit is difficult to quantify
in the same manner as lower labor costs or productivity gains,
but may nevertheless contribute to the firm's survival. This may
be especially so in companies that periodically have to negotiate
new contracts with employee unions.
Worker participation in the management of a company may
improve employee relations in a variety of ways. First, workers
may derive satisfaction from the process of collective decision-
making quite apart from the character of the decisions
reached.'6 Second, employee ownership creates a joint goal of
maximizing profits and strengthening the firm, which may re-
duce the inherent adversarial relationship between the employ-
ees and the firm-created by the employees' goal of maximizing
wages and benefits and the firm's conflicting goal of minimizing
the same. 165 Third, workers may gain psychological satisfaction
from the sense of being in control, which their participation in
firm decision-making enhances. 166 Fourth, employee involve-
ment in collective decision-making within the firm may be use-
ful training for participation in democratic political processes in
the larger society, which both the workers and the rest of society
should value. 167 Obviously, these benefits only occur in a com-
pany that has input from employees in its decision-making pro-
cess, rather than mere stock ownership by employees without
any true managerial input into matters affecting their com-
pany's direction.
163 Michael W. Melton, Demythologizing ESOPs, 45 TAx L. REv. 363, 385-86
(1990).
164 Hansmann, supra note 161, at 1769.
165 Id. at 1769-70.
166 Id. at 1770.
167 Id.
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D. FAVORABLE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
Discussion of the favorable legislation and tax treatment that
Congress has given ESOPs is important because ESOPs were cre-
ated by statute and are wholly dependent on federal tax subsi-
dies for their existence.1 68 As mentioned earlier, Kelso and
others have promoted ESOPs since the 1950s, although the sub-
stantial federal tax subsidies that Congress has granted to ESOPs
since 1974 has caused their increased popularity in the last two
decades.1 69 ESOPs c6st the federal government $2.5 billion in
tax revenues in 1986 and approximately $4.4 billion in 1990.170
Although a discussion regarding whether ESOPs are worthy of
these generous subsidies is beyond the scope of this Comment,
at least one commentator has concluded that ESOPs have failed
to meet the original policy goals found in the legislative history
supporting their statutory creation. 17' Members of the House
Ways and Means Committee, which introduced legislation to
limit the principal tax subsidy to ESOPs (the 50% lender inter-
est exclusion on ESOP debt, discussed below), apparently share
this view.' 72 This legislation, designed to lessen an estimated $8
billion loss of tax revenues over a 5-year period, along with other
such legislation, could possibly reduce the popularity of ES-
OPs. 173 Despite the criticism of tax incentives awarded to ES-
OPs, these incentives continue to be a substantial benefit of
employee ownership, and warrant a discussion of the tax advan-
tages currently available to companies with ESOPs under the ex-
isting legal framework.
All ESOPs must satisfy certain qualification requirements of
I.R.C. section 401 (a) to enjoy the tax advantages available under
the code.' 74 For instance, the employee must have the choice of
either receiving benefits in cash, based on the fair market value
of the stock, or receiving shares of the stock directly. 175 In addi-
tion to such qualification requirements, there are numerous re-
168 Elana R. Hollo, Note, The Quiet Revolution: Employee Stock Ownership Plans
and Their Influence on Corporate Governance, Labor Unions, and Future American Pol-
icy, 23 RUrGERS LJ. 561, 592 (1992).
169 Hansmann, supra note 161, at 1797.
170 Hollo, supra note 168, at 592.
171 Id. at 594.
172 Hansmann, supra note 161, at 1816 nn.205-06.
173 Id. at 1812, 1816 n.205.
174 Spector, supra note 11, at 765.
175 I.R.C. §§ 409(h), 4975(e)(7) (1988).
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strictions placed on leveraged ESOPs.' 76 The loan made to the
ESOP must meet the following requirements along with other
restrictions: primarily benefit plan participants and benefi-
ciaries; bear a reasonable rate of interest; feature terms compa-
rable to an arm's length transaction between independent
parties; and the ESOP may only use the proceeds to purchase
qualified employer securities, such as publicly-traded common
stock, if the company has such stock.1 77
Employer contributions to an ESOP or any other qualified
plan are deductible by the employer. 178 This effectively permits
an employer to repay the principal of a bank loan to a leveraged
ESOP on a pre-tax basis. 179 In addition to the employer deduct-
ing the ESOP contributions used to repay the loan, I.R.C. sec-
tion 133 permits the lender to exclude fifty percent of the
interest income that it receives on loans made to leveraged ES-
OPs for the purpose of acquiring employer securities. 180 This
allows the ESOP to obtain a lower interest rate from the lender,
possibly reducing financing costs by as much as one-third. 181
Congress placed a significant restriction on section 133 by
making this benefit available only when the leveraged ESOP
owns more than 50% of the company's stock, along with other
restrictions. 82 This limitation, added in 1989, "suggests that
Congress may be interested in limiting special tax treatment to
cases where the ESOP holds a meaningful portion of the em-
ployer's stock, and may be moving away from the prior ap-
proach which valued any employee stock ownership, even a
minority interest in a closely held company."183 United may
have considered this factor when it structured its buyout to
award employees a majority of its stock.
176 Spector, supra note 11, at 765. A leveraged ESOP acts as a corporate financ-
ing vehicle by allowing the company to borrow through the ESOP.
177 Id.
178 Id.
17 Id. (citing I.R.C. § 404(a) (3)).
180 Id.
181 William R. Levin, The False Promise of Worker Capitalism: Congress and the Lever-
aged Employee Stock Ownership Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 148, 156 (1985).
182 Melton, supra note 163, at 408.
183 Id. at 408-09. Congress may also be yielding to the many critics of the gen-
erous subsidies that leveraged ESOPs receive, such as William Levin, who attack
Congress's three justifications for favorable treatmeht of leveraged ESOPs: subsi-
dized financing creates wealth for employees; the leveraged ESOP program dis-
tributes future wealth over a broader base; and increased ownership improves
productivity. Levin, supra note 181, at 159.
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Another tax advantage to corporations with ESOPs is the de-
ductibility of dividends paid on stock held by the ESOP. 184 This
avoids the double taxation that usually occurs when a corpora-
tion pays dividends to its stockholders.
Along with tax subsidies and other favorable legislation Con-
gress has granted ESOPs in the past two decades, ESOPs also
appear to have the support of the Clinton administration. Fol-
lowing the United buyout, U.S. Labor Secretary Robert Reich
remarked: "This is a landmark agreement. United's sharehold-
ers have signaled to corporate boards and shareholders
throughout the country that employee ownership can renew
companies and preserve jobs."1 8 5 In early 1995, Transportation
Secretary Federico Pefia unveiled several changes the Clinton
administration was proposing for the airline industry, and on
the list he included "examining ways to encourage more em-
ployee ownership of airlines, along the lines of United Airlines'
recent accord with its workers."1 86
Along with the blessing ESOPs have received from Congress
and the Clinton administration on the federal level, several
states have enacted broadened ownership assistance acts
(BOAAs) encouraging employee ownership through ESOPs. 187
The BOAAs range from simple declarations of the state's policy
to broaden the base of capital ownership through ESOPs, to leg-
islation supporting broadened employee ownership through se-
curities and tax law reforms.1 8 8 Employee ownership assistance
acts are similar to BOAAs, but legislatures specifically designed
them to encourage employee ownership to prevent a plant clo-
sure. 89 Such legislation demonstrates the favorable political en-
vironment that ESOPs currently enjoy at both the federal and
state levels.
184 Glick, supra note 10, at 243.
185 Ziemba, supra note 1, at 14. Reich also noted that " [f]or years, top CEOs'
incomes have been linked to stock prices. Now, even blue-collar workers at the
bottom of the totem pole will be reading the daily quotes in the New York Stock
Exchange." Jones & Schmit, supra note 41, at B1.
186 Kevin G. Salwen & David Wall, Pena Unveils Proposal for Corporation to Manage
Air-Traffic Control System, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1994, at A2.
187 Virginia L. Duquet, Note, Advantages and Limitations of Current Employee Own-
ership Assistance Acts to Workers Facing a Plant Closure, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 93, 106
(1984).
188 Id. at 106-07.
189 Id. at 107.
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VI. DISADVANTAGES OF EMPLOYEE-OWNED AIRLINES
A. REQUIRES COMPROMISE AMONG DIFFERENT
EMPLOYEE GROUPS
As the United buyout demonstrates, it is difficult to package
an employee buyout in a manner that satisfies the airlines' four
major employee groups: pilots, mechanics, flight attendants,
and non-union employees. United has more than 17,000 flight
attendants, and their union has refused to participate in the
buyout because of United's decision to establish flight attendant
bases in foreign countries. 190 At the time that talks broke down
in September 1994, United had sought a $416 million invest-
ment from its flight attendants in exchange for a 13% stake in
UAL and a seat on the board of directors.' 91 Following the lead
of their counterparts at United, in June 1995, USAir flight at-
tendants turned down an offer to exchange nine percent of
their pay for a twenty percent equity stake to be divided among
all of USAir's employees.' 92 Kiwi's new CEO is considering ad-
ding a board seat for its flight attendants because of their resent-
ment for the pilots' management of the airline.'
93
The participation of the flight attendants, the front-line em-
ployees of an airline, is crucial for the public's perception that
an employee buyout is working. 94 The flight attendants are in
contact with, and making impressions upon, United's 182,000
daily passengers.' Morale would also suffer at United if the
flight attendants continue to receive scheduled pay increases
that other employees gave up in return for employee owner-
190 Judy Ward, United Front, FIN. WORLD, Sept. 1, 1994, at 27. United has ob-
tained wage concessions in exchange for stock from approximately 800 of its
6300 employees abroad. MichaelJ. McCarthy, Top 2 UAL Officers Got $17 Million
in '94 Stock Options, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1995, at B4. ,
191 Ramon Lopez, Cabin Crew Alone at United/TWA, FLIGHT INT'L, Sept. 14,
1994. At the time the flight attendants' union formally disbanded its negotiating
committee, it issued a statement citing the reason as "flight attendants were not
receiving sufficient value for their proposed concessions." United Airlines Names
Magay to be President of Short-Haul Shuttle, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at B5.
192 Carl Quintanilla & MichaelJ. McCarthy, Airlines: A Survey, WALL ST. J., Aug.
22, 1995, at Al.
193 'Quintanilla, supra note 94, at B4.
194 Ward, supra note 190, at 27. As Professor Dempsey puts it: "Happy employ-
ees can give -passengers a lovely trip, and lure them back for another, and an-
other. Angry, embittered employees can do the opposite." Dempsey, supra note
145, at 26.
195 Rose & Norton, supra note 136, at Al.
6671996]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ship.196 It is also necessary for United's last major union group
to join the buyout to avoid the untenable prospect of a union
going on strike against a union-owned company. 197 To avoid
this situation, observers believe that United will probably con-
tinue trying to include the flight attendants in the buyout before
their union contract expires in the spring of 1996.198
Each of United's two union groups that participated in the
buyout had a substantial number of opponents. Dissident pilots
circulated a survey claiming that 1,250 of 1,700 pilots polled op-
posed the buyout.' 99 The mechanics voted to approve the
buyout by a narrow fifty-four percent majority, with dissidents
going to court in an unsuccessful last-minute attempt to block
the deal. °° In addition, the Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Associ-
ation focused on the resentment surrounding the buyout when
it campaigned to replace the International Association of Ma-
chinists, United's largest union, as the union representing
United's mechanics. 20 1 Although the buyout contract binds
whichever union represents the mechanics, the union battle has
further divided the mechanics at a time when management
would like to have labor harmony and a focus on improving cus-
tomer service.2° The union leaders of these two important
union groups, both the pilots and mechanics, must mend their
internal rifts in order for United's buyout to work.
There were also many dissatisfied members of United's fourth
employee group-its 28,000 non-union employees.20 3 The com-
plaints ranged from the perception that the non-union employ-
ees were forced into the buyout without the benefit of a vote, to
the notion that their 8.25% pay cut was deeper than the two
participating union groups' higher percentages because those
employees had enjoyed substantially higher salaries prior to the
buyout.20 4 Outgoing Chairman Stephen M. Wolf replied to this




199 Labich, supra note 150, at 72.
200 Id.
201 Michael J. McCarthy, UAL's United Could Face an Upheaval by Mechanics as
They Vote on a Union, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1994, at B9.
202 Id.
203 Labich, supra note 150, at 72.
204 Id.
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suffered the most in a downsizing if the buyout did not occur.
Wolfs justification did not appear to convince the six nonunion
reservation agents who filed a lawsuit, which is pending in fed-
eral court in Atlanta, to try to overturn the concessions that
their group gave up in the buyout.20 6
B. LIMITS OPTIONs AVAmABLE TO MANAGEMENT
In some cases, awarding ownership to employees in return for
wage concessions may limit certain options that would otherwise
be available to the company's management. The United buyout
contained the following agreements that restrict the carrier's
operational flexibility: job protection for participating union
members, prohibitions against selling a Denver training center
and certain maintenance facilities, and restrictions on the shar-
ing of computer reservation system codes with other domestic
and international airlines. °7 These concessions are not without
critics. Standard & Poor's Ratings Group and Moody's Investors
Service Inc. cited "reduced management flexibility" and "con-
cern over the company's future financial flexibility" for their
negative ratings of UAL securities following the buyout.2°8 .
Indeed, these restrictions may already be hampering United
in its possible merger with USAir. The no-layoff guarantees that
were granted to United's workers would restrict its ability to re-
duce its workforce if it added the 45,000 USAir workers.2 0 9 The
decision-making granted to United's employees in the buyout
may also impede a merger with USAir. °
205 The buyout preserved many of the non-union jobs. Ott, supra note 35, at
20.
206 McCarthy, supra note 37, at A8.
207 Ott, supra note 35, at 20.
208 McCarthy & Quintanilla, supra note 1, at A6. Even United acknowledges
that the buyout will limit the options available to management:
The new labor agreements and governance structure could inhibit
management's ability to alter strategy in a volatile, competitive in-
dustry by restricting certain operating and financing activities, in-
cluding the sale of assets and'the issuance of equity securities and
the ability to achieve additional reductions in wages and benefits.
UAL's ability to react to competition may be hampered further by
the fixed long-term nature of these various agreements.
UNITED AIR LINES INC., SEC FoRM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTER ENDED SEPT. 30, 1994
19.1
209 Carl Quintanilla et al., USAir Merger Discussions Could Spark a Consolidation
Movement by Airlines, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1995, at A4.
210 Id.
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Along with limiting the options available to management,
many experts fear the direction that management might take
after a buyout: that employee-owners will manage the airline to
fulfill workers' needs, not customers. n  One expert doubts
whether union-elected directors could make the tough cost-cut-
ting and layoff decisions, stating that "I don't think they'll have
the necessary discipline. 2 1 2 One United director voiced con-
cern about the owner-employees pushing for unprofitable
growth, expressing "I'm worried the employees, with a few good
quarters under their belt, will want to start buying more
planes."213 Of course, in the United transaction, only three of
UAL's twelve directors represent employees, which reduces the
fear that union directors will significantly shift the focus of
United's management.
C. RISKS TO EMPLOYEES
A disadvantage to employee ownership from the employees'
perspective is the inherent risks involved in trading wage in-
creases and other benefits for ownership of the airline. Profes-
sor Hyde believes that employees' risk aversion is the single
greatest problem with employee ownership and the single great-
est obstacle to its wider spread.2 14 After all, employees of many
companies already depend on their employers' continued exist-
ence for wages, health care and other benefits, retirement secur-
ity, and possibly even maintaining the market value of their
home. 5 Why should the employees take on any more risks as-
sociated with the failure of their company by actually buying the
company?
Hyde attributes the historical low incidence of worker owner-
ship in most industries and the tendency of worker-owned firms
to revert to private ownerships to this risk aversion.2 16 Employ-
211 Jones & Schmit, supra note 41, at lB. Gerald Greenwald, the new CEO at
United, strongly disagreed with this concern during another UAL buyout at-
tempt, when he stated that (assuming the buyout would take place) "professional
management-not union leadership-will run the airline." Gerald Greenwald,
Letters to the Editor: Union-Run United an ESOP Fable, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1990, at
All. Greenwald further argued that research of other employee-owned compa-
nies would reveal that neither union politics nor short-term planning typifies the
management of such firms. Id.
212 Jones & Schmit, supra note 41, at lB.
213 McCarthy, supra note 37, at Al.
214 Hyde, supra note 101, at 205-06.




ees may justify their risk aversion by looking back to the growth
of employee stock ownership in the 1920s-and the millions of
dollars lost by employees after the 1929 market crash. 217
When employees agree to c6ncessions-for-stock buyouts they
are gambling their future incomes and pensions on hopes of the
airline achieving stability, profitability, and stock appreciation.
For the United employees, the price of UAL's stock determines
how much stock the employees receive in return for their wage
concessions. 218 The employees missed an opportunity to receive
an additional eight percent stake in United because UAL's stock
failed to reach the required level 9.2 1 Eastern and other such air-
line failures serve as prime examples of employees losing their
gamble with airline stock ownership. Professor Paul S. Demp-
sey, Director of the Transportation Law program at the Univer-
sity of Denver College of Law and president of Americans for
Sound Aviation Policy, warns that "[n] o employee should bet his
kids' college education on the stock certificates which replace
what was once in his pay envelope."2 20 He pessimistically views
the trend towards employee ownership in the airline industry as
employees "exercising the opportunity to own a piece of the
rock in an industry falling like one."2 2
Professor Dempsey has good reason for concern. An airline is
probably experiencing financial difficulties if it is even enter-
taining a concessions-for-stock trade, so it is questionable how
desirable it would be to become a part-owner. The counter- ar-
gument is, of course, that it is better to have lower wages and
risky stock ownership than no job at all.
D. ERISA ISSUES
Another disadvantage of employee ownership through an
ESOP is the restrictions imposed on ESOPs by the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).222 ERISA's clas-
sification of ESOPs as retirement plans is interesting, given
Senator Long's statement introducing the Employee Ownership
Act of 1983: "The ESOP's primary purpose, however, is not to
serve as a retirement vehicle but, rather, to serve as an incentive
for corporations to structure their financing in such a way that
217 Id. at 204.
218 McCarthy, supra note 37, at A8.
219 Id.
220 Dempsey, supra note 55, at All.
221 Id.
222 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
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employees can gain an ownership stake in the company for
which they work."22 ' ESOP inventor Louis Kelso persuaded Sen-
ator Long to include ESOPs in ERISA in 1974.4 Kelso "would
have preferred that ESOPs not be considered retirement plans,
but ERISA was the vehicle that was most available and practical
at the time."22 5 If Congress had not classified ESOPs as retire-
ment plans, they would have had tostand on their own to justify
their special tax treatment.2 26
ERISA rules conflict with ESOP goals in the following three
areas: 1) investment diversification requirements; 2) prohibited
transaction rules; and 3) restrictions on the price at which an
ESOP may purchase stock.227 Exceptions within ERISA have re-
solved the practical conflicts in the first and second areas, yet
the policy conflicts remain.
Central to any retirement plan investment strategy is the de-
sire to maximize return and minimize risk.2 28 Theoretically, ac-
quiring stock in a variety of companies with different risk
characteristics reduces the risk that a certain company's stock
will decrease in value.2 2 9 ERISA adopted this policy by requiring
that the assets of a retirement plan be diversified. 230 ERISA,
however, exempts ESOPs from the diversification requirement
because ESOPs have a separate requirement that they must in-
vest primarily in employer stock. 31
There is a substantial risk to ESOPs investing all of the em-
ployees' savings in the employer's stock. In a corporate liquida-
tion, employees' status as shareholders places them behind even
unsecured creditors in their claims on the assets of the com-
pany. 3 2 Although the risk of loss is higher when plan invest-
ments are not diversified, ESOP proponents argue that the risk
is necessary and acceptable because diversification of the ESOP
223 Melton, supra note 163, at 419 n.124 (quoting 129 CONG. REc. S16,637
(daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983)).
224 Id.
225 Id. (quoting Corey Rosen, How Well Are ESOPs Working?, 28 TAX NOTES
1605, 1606 (Sept. 30, 1985)).
226 Id. at 394.
227 Id. at 389.




232 Melton, supra note 163, at 390. To a limited extent unsecured claims for
contributions to pensions and other retirement benefits are priority claims in
bankruptcy. Id. at 390 n.132 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (1988)).
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portfolio eliminates the alignment of employee interests with
shareholders. 23 ESOPs' absence of investment diversification,
however, runs counter to a basic goal of retirement income
policy.2 -
A second conflict exists between ERISA's prohibited transac-
tions' rules and an ESOP's investment in the stock of the em-
ployer-sponsor.3 5 Retirement plans are separate entities from
the plan sponsor, and ERISA prohibits certain transactions with
that sponsor.3 6 Similar to diversification requirements, ERISA
allows an exception from the prohibited transaction rules for an
ESOP's investment in the stock of the sponsor.23 7 But a retire-
ment plan's ownership of the employer-sponsor's stock arguably
defeats ERISA's goal of maintaining independence from the em-
ployer-sponsor.
A third area of conflict between ERISA and ESOP involves the
requirement that retirement plans pay "adequate consideration"
when acquiring employer stock.238 ERISA defines adequate con-
sideration as follows: 1) for public securities it is the price "pre-
vailing on a national securities exchange," and 2) for private
securities it is "the fair market value of the asset as determined
in good faith" by a plan fiduciary.2 "39
ERISA's adequate consideration provision killed certain trans-
actions that otherwise met the policy goals of ESOPs. 2 40 The
Senate Finance Committee proposed legislation in the past to
exempt ESOPs from the adequate consideration provisions of
ERISA, but Congress ultimately deleted that portion of the legis-
lation. 241 The adequate consideration provision is another ex-
ample of ESOPs' employee ownership goals conflicting with
ERISA's retirement plan goals.
233 Id. at 390.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 391.
236 Melton, supra note 163, at 391.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 392 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1108(e)(1) (1994)).
239 Id. n.143 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(18) (1994)).
240 Id. at 393 (citing the failed leveraged buyout of Scott & Fetzer Co., which
the Department of Labor stopped because the consideration to be paid by the
ESOP for its percentage of the company was too high, resulting in an unfair deal
for employees).
241 Melton, supra note 163, at 393-94.
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E. SECURITIES REGULATIONS
In addition to the ERISA requirements, companies structur-
ing employee ownership through ESOPs must also consider the
applicability of the federal securities laws. The courts are split
on the issue of whether participants' interests in ESOPs are "se-
curities" within the meaning of the federal securities laws.2 42
The importance of this determination on ESOP transactions
warrants a brief background of the federal securities laws and a
look at. the different courts' analyses in the seminal cases that
address the issue of whether an ESOP constitutes a security.
As a general rule, purchasers of securities are entitled to the pro-
tections afforded by the Securities Act of 1933, [as amended, 243 ]
(1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, [as
amended,2 "] (1934 Act) [(collectively referred to as "the
Acts") 245]. These protections include mandatory disclosure of fi-
nancial information necessary to make an informed investment
decision as well as broad remedies entitling investors to redress
for any [materially] false or misleading statements made in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of [securities] .246
Arguably, these disclosures would especially benefit blue-collar
union employees, like many of those currently participating in
employee buyouts in the airline industry because these employ-
ees are probably "unsophisticated in the intricacies of the finan-
cial markets, and . . . would probably not otherwise own
financial securities. '247 The protections afforded by the Acts are
only available, however, when the particular investment being
offered fits the Acts' definition of a security.
One approach used by the courts in determining whether an
ESOP interest is a security is the application of the Howey test,
named after the United States Supreme Court case SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co.24s This test, used to determine whether an instrument
qualifies as an investment contract and thus subject to the Acts
contains three prongs: 1) the instrument involves an investment
of money; 2) it is an investment in a common enterprise; and 3)
242 Sean S. Hogle, Note, The Employee as Investor: The Case for Universal Applica-
tion of the Federal Securities Laws to Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 34 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 189, 191 (1992).
248 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1988).
244 Id. §§ 78a-78kk.
245 Hogle, supra note 242, at 190.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 191.
248 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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there is a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from
the managerial or entrepreneurial efforts of others.249
The Supreme Court applied the Howey test to an employee
benefit pension plan in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
DanieL2 50 The plan in Daniel was "'involuntary', meaning all
union members had to accept the plan as a condition of employ-
ment if a majority of employees voted to participate in it, and
'noncontributory,' meaning the employees paid nothing to the
plan on an individual basis, although they did relinquish an un-
specified amount of higher wages." 251 According to the Court,
the plan failed the first and third prongs of the Howey test.252
First, the wages given up by the employees were not a significant
enough portion of the employees' total compensation to consti-
tute an "investment."253 Second, the transaction failed the "ex-
pectation of profits" prong because the plan derived eighty
percent of its income from employer contributions, not invest-
ment profits, and the realization of plan benefits depended on
meeting vesting requirements, not the fund's investment suc-
cess.254 The Court added that ERISA already regulated this type
of noncontributory, involuntary plan, and neither congressional
intent nor actions by the SEC indicated that they meant for the
Acts to cover such pension plans.255
In Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, the Supreme Court
adopted a textual approach to determine whether the Acts ap-
ply to a certain transaction or investment.256 The Court noted
that the language itself is the starting point for interpreting any
statute.257 Because Landreth involved the sale of stock, though
the label of the instrument is not determinative, and the defini-
tional provisions of the Acts contained the term "stock," the in-
strument at issue must possess the traditional characteristics of
stock; they include the distribution of dividends, appreciability,
and voting rights. 258 Subsequent to Landreth, courts only use the
Howey test in cases involving unusual instruments that the other
249 Hogle, supra note 242, at 196.
250 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
251 Hogle, supra note 242, at 197 (citing Danie 439 U.S. at 553).
252 Id. at 197-99.
253 Id. at 198.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 198-99.
256 Hogle, supra note 242, at 199.
257 Id. at 200.
258 Id.
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specifically enumerated securities listed in the Acts do not de-
scribe, including ESOP interests.
2 59
Several cases have arisen since Landreth requiring the courts
to analyze whether a concessions-for-stock trade falls under the
Securities Acts. Two such cases used the Howey-Daniel test with
conflicting outcomes: Childers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,26 ° hold-
ing that the Acts were inapplicable,, and Uselton v. Commercial
Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc.,261 holding a ESOP to be a security,
thus making the Acts applicable. 62 An important fact distin-
guishes the cases as to the investment prong of the test. In
Childers the union vote bound all its employees to the involun-
tary wage-ESOP swap, while in Uselton the individual employees
could decide whether or not to participate. 63 The Uselton case
probably would have come out the same as Childers, finding no,
existence of a security thereby rendering the Acts inapplicable,
had the employer required that its employees vote collectively to
participate in the plan, which is probably the majority method
for adopting a concession-for-stock trade.2
These two cases also differed in the the "expectation of profit"
prong. The Uselton court held that the employees were relying
on the efforts of their employer's management for profit, thus
satisfying the prong.2 65 The Childers court, however, held that
the employees were merely relying on the financial recovery of
the company as a whole for stock appreciation, not on the ef-
forts of their managers, thereby failing the third prong of the
test.
Two other cases dealing with the same issue held that the Acts
did apply to ESOPs formed through concessions-for-stock
trades, basing their analyses on the Landreth approach instead of
the Howey-Daniel test.2 66 Both Hood v. Smith's Transfer Corp. 26 7
and Harris v. Republic Airlines, Inc.2 68 held that the ESOP interest
259 Id. at 202.
260 688 F. Supp 1357 (D. Minn. 1988).
261 940 F.2d 564 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 983 (1991).
262 Hogle, supra note 242, at 215-16.
263 Id. at 216-17.
264 Id. at 217.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 222-25.
267 762 F. Supp. 1274 (W.D. Ky. 1991).




constituted stock, which is a security within the definitions pro-
vided in the Acts.269
In light of the uncertainty in this area, a company contemplat-
ing the formation of an ESOP or a concessions-for-stock trade
should probably comply with the registration requirements of
the Securities Acts. Although this adds time and expense to the
buyout process, it provides the employees with the disclosures
necessary for an informed decision and helps avoid future litiga-
tion resulting from the transaction.
F. OTHER LEGAL OBSTACLES
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 270 also impedes
employee ownership in collective bargaining through its limita-
tions regarding information disclosure and subjects of bargain-
ing.271 Information regarding the company's operation and
financial condition is important both during negotiations for
employee ownership, and in implementing employee owner-
ship. 272 But, unless an employer claims an inability to pay, the
NLRA fails to impose a duty to disclose financial information
such as profits, costs, sales, and production levels.2 73 Such infor-
mation is important to allow the employees to make informed
decisions regarding concessions and other buyout provisions.
The company may disclose such information voluntarily, but is
under no requirement to do so under NLRA guidelines.
The narrow interpretation of subjects for which collective bar-
gaining is required under the NLRA also limits the flexibility to
implement employee ownership and other forms of labor-man-
agement cooperation. 274 The "mandatory/permissive" distinc-
tion requires collective bargaining only for matters within the
"mandatory category."2 75 The following matters, though cer-
tainly of importance to employees, are interpreted as "permis-
sive": selling a business or component, disposing of assets,
restructuring or consolidating operations, subcontricting, in-
vesting in labor-saving machinery, changing the methods of fi-
nance or sales, advertising, product design, and other such
269 Hogle, supra note 242, at 222-25.
270 29 U.S.C §§ 151-169 (1993).
271 Moberly, supra note 21, at 781.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 782.
275 Id.
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decisions.276 Such a narrow interpretation of mandatory leaves
it up to company management to involve employees or their
representatives in major corporate decisions-regardless of
whether the company is employee-owned or not.
To summarize, there are numerous advantages and disadvan-
tages of an airline implementing employee ownership. While
the financial incentives of lower labor costs and favorable tax
breaks are easily measurable, the intangible benefit of improved
employee productivity and morale should not be underesti-
mated. These advantages must be weighed by the airline's man-
agement and employees against the numerous hurdles to
implementation, decreased flexibility, and the risks associated
with trading wages for stock. There is obviously no formula for
weighing the advantages and disadvantages, and each airline
and its employees must consider how employee ownership
would affect its unique short and long-term business plan and
financial condition.
VII. THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYEE-OWNED AIRLINES
Experts expect employee ownership to continue to grow in
this country: "By the year 2000, more than a quarter of the com-
panies traded on the New York Stock Exchange, the American
Stock Exchange and Over-the-Counter Market will be more than
15 percent owned by their employees. "277
In the airline industry, other carriers recently considered con-
cessions-for-stock trades. In July 1994, the same month as the
United buyout, the pilots' union at USAir recommended to the
other unions that they trade wage concessions for a minority
stake in the airline and board representation.2 78 Concessions-
for-stock discussions broke off, however, with both pilot279 and
flight attendant 280 unions. USAir, which lost more than $3 bil-
lion in the last 6 years, has the highest labor costs in the indus-
276 Moberly, supra note 21, at 783 (citing United Technologies v. NLRB, 115
L.L.R.M. (BNA) 1281 (1984)).
277 Hyde, supra note 101, at 160 (quotingJOSEPH BLAsi & DOUGLAS KRUSE, THE
NEW OWNERS: THE MASS EMERGENCE OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP IN PUBLIC COMPA-
NIES AND WHAT IT MEANS TO AMERICAN BUSINESS 3 (1991)).
278 Carl Quintanilla, USAir's Pilots Propose Equity for Concessions, WALL ST. J., JIly
22, 1994, at A3.
279 Carl Quintanilla, USAir Pilot Union Chairman Resigns After Criticism, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 11, 1995, at A4.
280 Quintanilla & McCarthy, supra note 192, at Al.
678
EMPLOYEE-OVWNED AIRLINES
try. 2 8 1 Larger airlines have targeted USAir as a possible merger
candidate.
American Airlines's CEO Robert Crandall likes the idea of
employee ownership for his airline, declaring that one way or
another, "major airlines must deal with the labor-cost prob-
lem."28 2 Crandall would certainly favor such an arrangement
over a strike, after the five-day strike by American's flight attend-
ants in November 1993 cost the company $160 million in net
income.28
3
In January 1995, pilots at Southwest Airlines agreed to forgo
pay raises for five years and accept only slight increases over the
following five years in exchange for options to buy fourteen mil-
lion Southwest shares over the same ten-year period. 84 Industry
analysts'believe that the agreement will be a bargain for both the
pilots and Southwest, with one analyst calling the terms and
length of the agreement "indicative of the cooperation between
Southwest pilots and its management,... [which] continues to
stand in stark contrast to the standard, adversarial industry
norm."2815 Airlines tend to emulate Southwest, probably due to
its unbroken string of profitable years since 1973.286 Southwest
also has a history of labor peace and is one of the few major
carriers that has never asked its employees for wage givebacks.287
Professor Dempsey predicts that virtually all of the major air-
lines in the United States will soon be employee-owned in order
to match the cost advantage of those airlines that have already
adopted employee ownership. 8 Whether this trend will spill
into other industries on such a large scale will probably depend
on the success that the airline industry enjoys after it becomes
employee-owned. Professor Joseph Blasi predicts that
"[a] irlines will be a bellwether for the future of employee owner-
ship in this country."289
281 Quintanilla et al., supra note 209, at A4.
282 Jones & Schmit, supra note 41, at Bi. Crandall has openly stated that "par-
tial employee ownership-regardless of the level-is one of the options available
to help labor and management restructure. Other options may emerge else-
where." Susan Carey, Airline-Worker Ownership May Make a Slow Ascent, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 23, 1993, at A6.
283 Jones & Schmit, supra note 41, at Bi.
284 Maxon, supra note 147, at Dl.
285 Id.
2860'Brian, supra note 62, at A2.
287 Id.
288 Dempsey, supra note 55, at All.
289 Jones & Schmit, supra note 41, at B1.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
As this Comment demonstrates, there are numerous advan-
tages and disadvantages in adopting employee ownership in the
airline industry. While employee ownership may prove useful in
reducing labor costs and providing tax advantages in the short
term, it is too early to determine whether it is the best ownership
structure for the long term.
The benefit of a lower cost structure, even if for a limited pe-
riod, should not be underestimated. To increase traffic, airlines
reduced fares, which are lower now in real dollars than the in-
dustry's pre-1978 regulated period. 90 Because of lower fares,
the airlines that swapped stock for labor savings responded to
the industry's obvious need for lower costs to achieve profitabil-
ity. Airlines are relying on their new equity-for-concessions deals
to varying degrees: some are trying to remain profitable, while
others are counting on the savings to survive the nineties.
Though beneficial from a cost standpoint, employee owner-
ship should not be expected to cure all of the problems in the
troubled U.S. airline industry. As Professor Dempsey and other
airline deregulation critics point out, a major problem with the
airline industry is its "primordial tendency to engage in destruc-
tive competition." 29 1 Employee ownership cannot magically
shield the airline from external forces such as market conditions
and fuel prices., Many analysts predict that, whether employee-
owned or not, some of the weaker airlines will continue to fail,
especially those that lack a viable niche in the marketplace. 92
To maximize the benefits of their ownership, the employees
must actively participate in the airline, and not simply be silent
stockholders.2 93 The airlines that are making stock-for-conces-
sions deals with their employees are counting on "soft" benefits
such as improved morale, productivity, and customer service, in
addition to "hard" benefits such as lower labor costs and tax
benefits.
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Industry Report, 59J. AIR L. & CoM. 663, 666 (1994).
291 Dempsey, supra note 55, at All.
292 McCarthy, supra note 77, at B6.
293 As Professor Blasi argues, "[j]ust spreading stock certificates around a re-
structured company is not going to do it. (The company has] to focus on the
grass-roots stuff, the dirty details out of which long-term improvements are
made." Rose & Norton, supra note 136, at Al.
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This Comment does not attempt to persuade the reader that
the U.S. airline industry should or should not implement em-
ployee ownership on a large-scale basis. Because of the unique
characteristics of the U.S. airlines it would be difficult, perhaps
impossible, to assess whether the advantages outweigh the disad-
vantages for each airline comprising the industry, or to make
any generalizations that apply to the whole industry. The pros
and cons of employee ownership must be carefully weighed by
both the management and employees of each airline contem-
plating a buyout, and only if their expectations are realistic and
they are willing to give-and-take will they look back and consider
the transaction a success.

